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This contribution is based on a set of reflections presented at the REGov Workshop. These reflections were offered as part of a
panel discussion around the topic “New environmental regionalism.” Additional presentations provided in the context of this 
panel discussion include those of Jörg Balsiger, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (this volume), and Frédéric Giraut, 
University of Geneva (this volume). Webcasts of all presentations are available at http://www.reg-observatory.org/outputs.html.
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Keywords: International Union for the Conservation of Nature; Regional organization; Self-determination. 
I would like to share some insights into how an organization, or an institution, runs its own regionalization 
processes. That institution is the one I work for: the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN). 
IUCN is a global organization headquartered here in Switzerland. It is a rather unusual institution in that its largely 
conservation-based membership comprises a variety of different actors, including governments, government 
departments, and non-governmental organizations - a funny mix of states, governmental agencies, and civil society. 
IUCN also has six voluntary commissions with about 10,000 volunteer scientists, lawyers, social experts, and 
economists, as well as the part that I work for, the Secretariat. 
IUCN’s aim is to jointly produce a single program of work, which has five main areas. Our core focus is 
biodiversity conservation, that is what we are established for, but we also look at the intersection between 
biodiversity and the real world, in terms of climate change, energy, poverty, human security, economics, and in 
particular issues that have to do with greening the world economy.  
About three or four years ago, I headed an internal study of the organization, looking at our own regionalization 
and decentralization processes. IUCN’s governance system, our members if you like, is organized around a set of 
regions that are based on our statutes, that is our charter. These regions were set in 1977 and are largely based 
around modifications of United Nations regions. The regions were defined in a Cold War era, so for us Europe is 
* Corresponding author. E-mail address: Sebastia.SEMENEGUITART@iucn.org. 
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
54  William Jackson. / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 14 (2011) 53–56
split into two structural regions, Western Europe and Eastern Europe, which of course does not exist as an entity 
anymore.  
Statutory regions are largely used as the basis for governance, and in particular for electing our Council (our 
board of governors), which is its primary function. The members themselves have the statutory right to self-organize 
themselves into committees or assemblies, which can be based on, but do not actually match statutory regions. 
Rather, committees and assemblies are based on what self-organized governments and civil society organizations 
choose to do within IUCN itself. They will often follow either language areas or sometimes geopolitics. The 
Secretariat in turn is organized around another completely different set of regions, which are much more mobile, 
able to move around quite quickly, and to some extent organized around bilateral development assistance, rather 
than other factors.  
The programmatic regions are the ones of most interest to me. Three or four years ago we restructured and 
intended, for example, to only have one African region. The objective was to try to coordinate the efforts of our 
organization with those of the African Union. It did not exactly work out that way, so we currently have two-and-a-
half regions in Africa.  
The programmatic construct was meant to be very flexible to move around, and to some extent to be larger than 
the regional economic bodies with which we try to coordinate very well. If I use South America as an example, there 
are probably five or six regional economic bodies we associate with, but our construct is a single entity for the 
whole of the continent. In Africa, our East and Southern Africa region works very closely with the Southern African 
Development Community, but we also cooperate very closely with the new Partnership for Africa in Development. 
Indeed in parts of Africa there are multiple layers of economic integration and also environmental (non-)integration, 
which results in competing interests that are sometimes a challenge in terms of national and domestic politics. 
Although IUCN is 63 years old, the organization really only began to regionalize or to move out into regions 
about thirty years ago, and as already noted regionalization was established around the concept of governance and 
elections for our members, it was not based around geopolitical, biological, or ecological criteria. It was really a 
simple matter of “carving up” the world in a way our governance system saw it at the time. At the subregional level 
our structure tends to focus much more on bioregional boundaries or ecological boundaries. Examples include the 
Congo Basin, focused on forest issues, or the Mekong River Basin.  
One of the most interesting examples is the Mediterranean, which is not one of our structural regions, but a 
regional entity we established around the Barcelona Convention on the Mediterranean Sea. What is particularity 
interesting is that it overlaps with several programmatic IUCN regions (North Africa, West Asia, two of our Europe 
parts, and also part of Eastern and Southern Africa) and also four of our statutory regions.  
When we established the Mediterranean region, we struggled somewhat with how to establish the boundaries. 
Rather than defining it ourselves or simply used the Barcelona Seas Convention, we asked our membership to self-
define around the question “what makes the Mediterranean?” This process produced some interesting results. For 
example, even though the Mediterranean construct does not extend over all of France, in geopolitical terms France 
of course exists as a state. So we asked our members in France – who identifies with the Mediterranean? It turned 
out that some members in Paris identified with the Mediterranean office and not with our Brussels office, while 
some members based in Montpellier identified with Brussels and not with the Mediterranean. Members were thus 
left to decide where they prefer to work, based around an ecological grouping. The Mediterranean example shows a 
region we did not build around language, nor around the European Union because we included all of North Africa, 
nor around nation states. We built it around the construct of the Mediterranean. 
Similarly, perhaps our most deliberately established region was Oceania or the Pacific. This has been around for 
three or four years and we again went out and asked the states and our  members what do you think makes sense. 
They again self-defined themselves, but particularly around the regional grouping of the Pacific Islands Forum, 
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which includes Pacific island developing states and also Australia and New Zealand. This was partly was around a 
shared ocean mass. 
At the subregional level, some of the work we do in the Pacific, particularly in New Zealand, tries to follow the 
reorganization of local government boundaries around ecological boundaries (watersheds and coast lines). Generally 
at a smaller scale, we have worked a lot on river basin management and at landscape levels, particularly the forest in 
the Congo Basin is an example of that. Or on the Mekong River, where we try to focus on semi-economic or semi-
ecological boundaries. That smaller scale has a complexity, where a regional approach works to an extent, but often 
the level of political integration is not there. In working on the Mekong River, for instance, the largest single factor 
that will affect that river is China, which is not very effectively engaged in the discourse. 
Another interesting area we work on is outside the jurisdiction of states: the high seas. We have recently done 
quite a lot of work looking at how to improve management of the high seas, which are actually being trawled out. A 
good example is the recent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, where potentially the oil spill will flow into the Sargasso 
Sea, which is one of the largest nursery sites of blue fin tuna and where there is a good chance of losing a whole 
year’s stock of blue fin tuna because of the oil spill. Yet the Sargasso Sea does not belong to any nation state, it is a 
commons. The regulatory and legal mechanisms for dealing with this make it awfully complex for a conservation 
organization. There are a set of regional fisheries management organizations but they have largely been ineffective 
in managing around science (they manage around trade and politics) and hence we see dropping of the fish stocks.  
We have also worked on transboundary issues in southern Africa. One of the very interesting issues at the 
moment is how nation states cooperate in the region between Angola, Botswana, and Namibia. Botswana is the 
home of a very interesting river basin delta, one of the only river deltas in the world that does not actually flow into 
the sea: it is annually flooded by rains that largely begin in Angola, then flows into a desert and disappears. Angola 
is very busy at the moment establishing large irrigated agriculture schemes. The flow of water is likely to change 
both the nature of that flow and the nutrification of the water, so from a conservation point of view, from a social 
dynamic and an economic point of view for Botswana it is really a major issue. But the source of the solution rests 
outside that nation state in a neighbor that receives extensive foreign support and investment, particularly in 
agriculture. 
How do we set priorities? Internally, we have a set of criteria that we try to focus on. Obviously our mission is 
about biodiversity conservation, so we focus around biodiversity values, but we also look at things like the degree of 
intervention that would be required to maintain those values, in other words focusing on areas that are of highest 
importance. Other criteria include the level of support we can expect from our membership there and the degree of 
political support we may get or not get, or resistance that we may get, the opportunities for building partnerships, 
particularly with regional economic bodies, the potential for our organization to not compete and demonstrate 
leadership, and the opportunity for us to do something that is supportive of existing efforts and not to duplicate. 
To conclude, the most interesting part of our membership structures is that they are built around a collective 
sense of identity between governments and civil society organizations that self-determine how they want to organize 
themselves inside a large conservation organization. Their success in integrating with other regional levels, whether 
that is a watershed or an economic body, is varied. Sometimes it has been very good, sometimes it has been very 
poor. Part of that reflects the quality of the regional economic body. It has been much more effective engaging at 
watershed level, the Congo Basin level for example, and perhaps we follow a “bricolage model” of how we have 
organized ourselves. It is certainly very dynamic.  
The driving force for the organization is to make itself relevant to its membership rather than economic or 
geographic factors. The key challenge is to try to keep up with geopolitical change. Our Secretariat boundaries can 
move very quickly, but our statutory boundaries cannot. South America is a wonderful example of very fast change 
in terms of geopolitics, particularly next to Venezuela. Another challenge for us is to link South to South, since there 
is still a tendency to bring everything into Europe and North America and take it back again. And financing our 
regional interventions because of the shift in development assistance - our organization is one hundred percent 
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addicted to development assistance - and then also that most environmental issues tend to be subregional, often 
transboundary in nature, rather than aligned to existing economic or geographic bodies. Lastly, a key issue for us is 
the challenge of enabling both civil society and scientific voices to come out in regional bodies, because they tend to 
be dominated by politics and economics, rather than science and civil society. 
